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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Claimants Jeffrey Reid and Sandra Snyder-Reid ("Claimants") appeal the stipulated 
Judgment of Forfeiture, entered by the district court on February 21, 2013, granting Respondent 
Barry McHugh ("McHugh") all right, title and interest in, and immediate possession of, One 
Blue 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser, VIN NO. JTEBUIIF470014172. 
B. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On January 2,2012, Kootenai County Sheriff Deputy Dennis Stinebaugh effected a 
traffic stop of the defendant vehicle, having been informed by a reporting party that the driver, 
Claimant Jeffrey Reid, was dumping marijuana plants by the side of the road and having 
observed the vehicle travel at a speed of 57 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. R. Vol. I, 
p. 112. Deputy Stinebaugh informed Claimant Jeffrey Reid why he had stopped the vehicle, 
asked whether any marijuana or paraphernalia was in the vehicle, and received consent to search 
the vehicle. R. Vol. I, p. 113. As Claimant Jeffrey Reid opened the rear hatch of the vehicle 
and gestured for the Deputy to look inside, Deputy Stinebaugh observed green plant material he 
identified as marijuana fall from the vehicle to the ground; Deputy Stinebaugh also smelled the 
strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle and located several cardboard boxes in the 
rear of the vehicle containing marijuana plant material. Id. Claimant Jeffrey Reid was arrested 
and booked for drug trafficking. R. Vol. I, p. 114. The vehicle was impounded and towed to 
Sunset Towing; it was then towed to the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office evidence yard. Id. 
Simultaneous with Claimant Jeffrey Reid's arrest, Kootenai County Sheriffs Office 
Detective Mark Ellis traveled to Claimants' home and made contact with Claimant Sandra 
Snyder-Reid. R. Vol. I, p. 106. Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid consented to a search of the 
residence. R. Vol. I, p. 107. A search of the residence and shed uncovered equipment for a 
marijuana grow operation, marijuana, paraphernalia, and U.S. currency. R. Vol. I, pp. 108-09. 
Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid was arrested and booked for manufacturing and trafficking 
marijuana. R. Vol. I, p. 109. All evidence was seized and booked into the Kootenai County 
Public Safety Building. Id. 
McHugh filed his Complaint in RE: Civil Forfeiture on January 19, 2012. R. Vo. I, p. 6. I 
Claimant Jeffrey Reid filed his unverified Answer on February 8, 2012. R. Vol. I, p. 11. 
Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid filed her unverified Answer on February 27,2012. R. Vol. I, p. 
14. Claimants filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 19,2012. R. Vol. I, p. 22. The district court 
heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss on May 24, 2012, and issued its written 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Joint Motion to Dismiss Action Under Idaho Code 
§ 37-2744 on June 12,2012. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 5-16; R. Vol. I, p. 29. Claimants thereafter filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial, but failed to notice the motion for hearing. R. 
Vol. I, p. 36. 
1 Claimants mistakenly refer to "the State" throughout their Defendant-Appellant's Opening 
Brief. This civil asset forfeiture action was not brought by the State of Idaho; rather, the action 
was instituted by McHugh, the "appropriate prosecuting attorney," in his name. See I.C. § 37-
27 44( c )(3). 
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On December 18,2013, the district court heard McHugh's motion for summary 
judgment. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 19-26. The court granted partial summary judgment as to the 2007 
Toyota FJ Cruiser in favor of McHugh. Tr. Vol. I, p. 41; R. Vol. I, p. 228. Before the Court at 
summary judgment was uncontested evidence of Claimant Jeffrey Reid's April 2, 2012, plea of 
guilty to the felony charge of Delivery of a Controlled Substance--Marijuana in the underlying 
Kootenai County criminal case CRF 2012-159 and Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid's March 26, 
2012, guilty plea to Manufacturing a Controlled Substance--Marijuana in the underlying 
Kootenai County criminal case CRF 2012-148. R. Vol. I, pp. 127 and 138. The court also 
heard Claimants' motion for reconsideration of denial of their Motion to Dismiss, noticed for 
hearing by McHugh, on December 18, 2013. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 19-26. The court denied 
Claimant's motion and granted McHugh attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of 
Claimants' having filed for reconsideration. Tr. Vol. I, p. 26, Ll. 10-12. 
On February 20,2013, the parties filed their Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, in 
which they stipulated and agreed "that the above-referenced action may be dismissed with 
prejudice, with each party to bear their own respective attorney fees and costs." R. Vol. I, pp. 
247-48. The parties also submitted an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and a Judgment of 
Forfeiture, both signed and entered by the Court on February 21,2013. R. Vol. I, pp. 252-256. 
The Judgment of Forfeiture recognizes the stipulation the parties entered into and orders 
McHugh receive $1,000.00 and all right, title, and interest in the defendant vehicle; the 
Judgment orders that Claimants receive $700.00. R. Vol. I, p. 256. The Judgment goes on to 
state that, "the Stipulation entered into by the parties hereby settles with prejudice all existing 
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material claims which relate to the seizure and forfeiture of the seized personal property and 
currency ... " Id. Claimants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 258 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. CLAIMANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING THE INSTANT 
APPEAL BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED BY CONSENT 
OF THE PARTIES AND CLAIMANTS FAILED TO EXPLICITLY AND 
UNEQUIVOCALL Y RESERVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
B. RESPONDENT BARRY MCHUGH IS ENTITLED TO HIS 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER IDAHO CODE § 
12-117 BECAUSE CLAIMANTS ACTED WITHOUT A REASONABLE 
BASIS IN FACT OR LAW. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
District court findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are not disturbed on 
appeal. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 142 Idaho 893, 897, 136 P.3d 364,368 
(Ct.App. 2006), citing State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct.App. 1999). 
Alleged violations of constitutional rights present mixed questions of law and fact. Id. 
"On appeal, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence, but we freely review the trial court's determinations as to whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." Id. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. CLAIMANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING THE INSTANT 
APPEAL BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED BY CONSENT 
OF THE PARTIES AND CLAIMANTS FAILED TO EXPLICITLY AND 
UNEQUIVOCALLY RESERVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
As a threshold matter, Claimants are precluded from appealing the district court's entry 
of a stipulated judgment. It is well settled that "a consent judgment is not subject to appellate 
review." Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington v. Mount, 97 Idaho 887, 887-88, 556 P.2d 70, 70-71 
(1976) (citations omitted). In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, the 
United States Supreme Court wrote: 
But the insurmountable difficulty is that the former decree appears upon its face 
to have been rendered by consent of the parties, and could not therefore be 
reversed, even on appeal. Courts of chancery generally hold that from a decree by 
consent no appeal lies. Although that rule has not prevailed in this court under the 
terms of the acts of congress regulating its appellate jurisdiction, yet a decree, 
which appears by the record to have been rendered by consent, is always 
affirmed, without considering the merits of the cause. A fortiori, neither party can 
deny its effect as a bar of a subsequent suit on any claim included in the decree. 
113 U.S. 261, 266, 5 S.Ct. 460, 462 (1885) (citations omitted). See also, Plasterers Local Union 
No. 346 v. Wyland, 819 F .2d 217, 219 (9th Cir. 1987) (generally, a party may not gain review of 
a stipulated judgment); Slaven v. Am., Trading Transp. Co., 146 F.3d 1066,1070 (9th Cir. 1998)? 
2 Circuit Courts of Appeal have examined the issue in terms of whether an ongoing adversarial 
relationship exists between the parties on appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 
that a settlement resolving a dispute and releasing the opposing litigants renders an appeal moot. 
Matter ofS. L. E., Inc., 674 F.2d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1982); and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has treated a voluntary dismissal with prejudice as depriving the Court of jurisdiction to consider 
an appeal because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment. Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills, 
785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Bowers v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 668 F.2d 
369,369 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 946,102 S.Ct. 2013 (1982». 
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Exceptions to the general rule that a party cannot appeal a judgment entered with that party's 
consent exist, but have no application in the instant matter. See, e.g., Pacific Nat. Bank of 
Washington, 97 Idaho at 888, 556 P.2d at 71 (exceptions include lack of actual consent to 
judgment; lack of jurisdiction over subject matter; judgment obtained by fraud, collusion or 
mistake; and judgment adversely affecting the public interest); Tapper v. Commissioner, 766 
F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing exceptions where a party did not actually consent or 
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Clapp v. Commm'r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 
1989) (subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment was lacking). The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Slaven, quoted Association of Community Orgs. For Reform Now v. Edgar, 99 F.3d 
261, 262 (7th Cir. 1996), in which Judge Posner discussed the requirement that reservations of 
the right to appeal be explicit: 
A party to a consent decree or other judgment entered by consent may not appeal 
unless it explicitly reserves the right to appeal. The purpose of a consent 
judgment is to resolve a dispute without further litigation, and so would be 
defeated or at least impaired by an appeal. The presumption, therefore, is that the 
consent operates as a waiver of the right to appeal. It is because the parties should 
not be left guessing about the finality and hence efficacy of the settlement that any 
reservation of a right to appeal should be explicit. 
Slaven, 146 F.3d 1066, 1070 (emphasis in original); see also, Coughlin v. Regan, 768 F.2d 468, 
470 (1 st Cir. 1986) ("While it is possible for a party to consent to a judgment and still preserve 
his right to appeal, he must reserve that right unequivocally, as it will not be presumed."). 
This Court, in Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington, held, "[w]here none of the foregoing 
exceptions are urged or argued, a decree which shows by the record to have been rendered by 
consent is always affirmed, without considering the merits of the cause." 97 Idaho 887, 888, 556 
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P.2d 70, 71 (citations omitted). Here, the parties entered into a StipUlation for Dismissal and 
filed the same on February 20, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 247. On February 20,2013, the parties also 
submitted an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and a Judgment of Forfeiture, both entered by 
the court on February 21,2013. R. Vol. I, pp. 252-57. The Judgment of Forfeiture states 
outright that the parties entered into a Stipulation for Judgment of Forfeiture. R. Vol. I, p. 255. 
And, the Judgment of Forfeiture orders, adjudges, and decrees that McHugh receive $1,000 in 
u.S. currency and all right, title, and interest in the defendant vehicle. Id. At no time did 
Claimants move the district court or this Court for any relief from the final Judgment. Nor have 
Claimants explicitly and unequivocally reserved the right to appeal. As such, Claimants are 
precluded from appealing the judgment entered by their consent. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND NO MATERIAL 
ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED WITH REGARD TO THE 
PROPORTIONALITY OF THE VALUE OF DEFENDANT 
VEHICLE TO THE CLAIMANTS' OFFENSES, AND 
CLAIMANTS ARE BARRED FROM ATTEMPTING TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE OF THE VEHICLE'S VALUE FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
Idaho Appellate Courts will not consider for the first time issues which were not properly 
raised before the district court. Eldridge v. Payette-Boise Water Users' Ass 'n, 50 Idaho 347, 296 
P. 1022 (1931) ("This Court will not consider an exhibit or evidence, not part of the record 
before the trial court.") Specifically, "[a]ppellate review is limited to the evidence theories and 
arguments that were presented below." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 
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(2007), quoting Obenchain v. }vfcAlvain Canst., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443,444 
(2006). In Nelson, this Court discussed an appellant's attempt to add to the record before the 
Court by attaching matters to his opening appellate brief; the Court noted the documents do not 
appear in the record, and, in fact, two of the documents are dated after entry of the orders being 
appealed. Nelson, 144 Idaho at 714, 170 P.2d at 379. The Court determined the appellant's 
attempt to introduce evidence in this manner was improper and the evidence was disregarded. 
Id. 
Here, Claimants attempt to present the Court with evidence of the purported value of the 
defendant vehicle in support of their claim that forfeiture of the vehicle amounts to an Eighth 
Amendment excessive fine. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 3. Claimants set forth the 
Kelley Blue Book Value, based on an internet search completed on July 7,2013. Id. The record 
on appeal is devoid of any evidence regarding the value of the defendant vehicle? In his Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, McHugh states that, with regard to 
Claimants' contention that forfeiture of the defendant vehicle amounts to an excessive fine and is 
violative of Eighth Amendment protections, " ... Reids provide the Court with no evidence as to 
the defendant vehicle's value." R. Vol. I, p. 211. Claimants cannot now present evidence 
3 In her Affidavit in Support of Motion to Release Vehicle Due to Hardship, Claimant Sandra 
Snyder-Reid testifies to making payments of $118.00 every two weeks on the vehicle. R. Vol. I, 
p. 162. And, in Exhibit 3 to the Claimants' Motion to Return Previously Seized Vehicle Pending 
Disposition of the State's Complaint Seeking Forfeiture, Claimants provide an unauthenticated, 
uncertified, and unacknowledged "Account History Inquiry," listing the payments they made and 
the balance remaining on the account. R. Vol. I, pp. 173-176. Neither reference to bi-monthly 
payments nor to a balance remaining serve to establish the value of the defendant vehicle, these 
references merely go to what Claimants pay for and owe on the vehicle. 
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beyond that which was before the district court. And, Claimants cannot present a vehicle value 
based on an internet search performed well after the date of entry of the judgment they now 
appeal. See, Nelson, supra. 
As McHugh argued before the district court, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Reese set 
forth the factors to consider in determining whether a forfeiture "bears some relationship to the 
gravity of the offense it is designed to punish." R. Vol. I, p. 211, quoting Reese, 142 Idaho at 
899, 136 P.3d at 370. The factors include: the nature and extent of the crime; whether the 
violation was related to other criminal activity; other penalties that may be imposed; the extent of 
harm caused; what other penalties are authorized by the legislature; the culpability of the 
claimant; the role played by the claimant and the defendant property in the offense; the nature 
and scope of the illegal operation at issue; the personal benefit reaped by the claimant; the value 
of the contraband involved; the fair market value of the defendant property to be forfeited; the 
intangible/subjective value of the defendant property to be forfeited; hardship to the claimant; 
other sanctions imposed by the sovereign seeking forfeiture; and the effect of the forfeiture on 
the claimant's family or financial circumstances. Id. At oral argument, counsel for McHugh 
argued: 
... although the Reids didn't list the [Reese]4 factors, I did list those for the Court 
in my briefing. And I would note that it is important for the Court to realize that 
the Reids did not provide the Court with evidence of the value of the vehicle, that 
the Reids did not testify that it was their only means of transportation, and the 
Reids never noted that the maximum fine that the legislature established for a 
conviction under---of delivery of marijuana is $25,000. Your Honor, this is a six-
4 The transcript incorrectly indicates counsel argued Claimants had not set forth "the Reids' 
factors." Tr. p. 28, L. 23. Reference was in fact made to the Reese factors. 
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year-old FJ Cruiser. There is no indication that the value of this FJ Cruiser 
somehow exceeds [the] maximum possible imposed fine of $25,000. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, Ll. 22-25; p. 29, Ll. 1-8. Claimants submitted no additional briefing to the 
district court to support their argument and respond to McHugh's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. At oral argument, counsel for Claimant Jeffrey Reid 
incorrectly claimed there had been no plea to manufacturing. Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 9. Counsel for 
Claimant Sandra Snyder-Reid incorrectly claimed she pled to simple possession. 5 Tr. Vol. I, p. 
32, L. 6. The attempt by Claimants to downplay the severity of the charges they pled guilty to, 
in an attempt to establish the forfeiture was excessive, was unsupported by any authority or 
evidence. Claimant Jeffrey Reids' counsel argued: 
In this case not only have we provided in our briefing documents that show-it is 
Exhibit 3 in our motion to return the previously-seized vehicle pending 
disposition of the state's complaint seeking forfeiture. It is payment schedule on 
and a balance for the account history. This vehicle was purchased through Avista, 
which is where my client works. And the car is being paid back to A vista through 
my client's paycheck. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, Ll. 19-25; p. 33, L. 1. In briefing, Claimants stated simply, "[t]his is the 
claimant's [sic] major mode of transportation and would be prohibitive to replace." R. Vol. I, p. 
201. At best, Claimants have provided a bare minimum of evidence as to only one of the 
numerous factors established to determine whether a punitive fine is grossly disproportionate to 
the gravity of the offense, namely, hardship. "The burden of demonstrating a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment is on the person asserting the constitutional violation." Reese, 142 Idaho at 
5 Counsel later corrected the record and admitted his client had pled guilty to manufacturing 
marijuana. Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, Ll. 15-16. 
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899, 1236 P.3d at 370 (citing Us. v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 816 (4th Cir. 2000) and State v. 
Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 946, 71 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ct.App. 2003». The district court properly 
determined that Claimants had not met their burden, and that no question of material fact 
remained with regard to the FJ Cruiser, specifically stating, " ... the fact that a party may put an 
argument in a brief doesn't raise a genuine issue of material fact." Tr. Vol. I, p. 38, Ll. 9-11. 
Having not met their burden below via the complete failure to present evidence of the Reese 
factors, Claimants cannot now make the argument to this Court or support their untimely 
arguments with evidence not presented to the district court. 
C. CLAIMANT'S PLEA ESTABLISHES THE DEFENDANT 
VEHICLE WAS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISTRIBUTION 
OR RECEIPT OF MARIJUANA, RENDERING THE 
FORFEITURE PROPER 
A guilty plea "is a judicial admission of all facts charged by the indictment or 
information" and by entering a plea, a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional constitutional or 
statutory defects and defenses. State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 546, 661 P.2d 328, 331 (1983). It 
is without question that a guilty plea may be used to establish issue preclusion, or collateral 
estoppel, in a subsequent civil suit. United States v. Section 18, 976 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 
1992); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978). Claimants' argument that the 
record is devoid of evidence that the defendant vehicle was used for the purpose of distribution 
or receipt of marijuana is entirely inapt given Claimant Jeffrey Reid's guilty plea to delivery of 
manJuana. 
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As previously argued to the district court, Claimant Jeffrey Reid pled guilty to the 
delivery of marijuana. R. Vol. I., pp. 123-127. Specifically, Claimant Jeffrey Reid pled to the 
Second Amended Information, which accuses: 
That the Defendant, JEFFREY ALBERT REID, on or about the 2nd day of 
January, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofIdaho, did knowingly and 
unlawfully deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana, a Schedule I 
controlled substance ... 
R. Vol. I, pp. 133-34. Idaho's Uniform Controlled Substances Act defines "deliver" or 
"delivery" as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one (1) person to another of a 
controlled substance ... " I.C. § 37-2701(g). "Distribute" is defined in the Idaho Code as meaning 
"to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance." I.C. § 37-2701(k). 
Statutory interpretation necessarily involves a statute being construed as a whole in order to give 
effect to legislative intent. George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 
P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Sf. Alphonsus Reg. Med 
etr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-86, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011). Therefore, Idaho Code § 37-
2744(a)( 4)'s language, stating that conveyances used, or intended for use, to transport, or 
facilitate the transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, of controlled 
substances for the purpose of distribution or receipt are subject to forfeiture, must be read in 
conjunction with the definitions in I.C. § 37-2701. 
It follows that Claimant Jeffrey Reid's guilty plea to delivery of marijuana as charged in 
the Information, and on the date of the facts testified to by Deputy Stinebaugh in his affidavit, 
necessarily establishes that the defendant FJ Cruiser was used to transport or facilitate the 
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transportation, delivery, receipt, possession or concealment, for the distribution or receipt of 
marijuana. Claimant Jeffrey Reid's plea is a judicial admission to the Second Amended 
Information. R. Vol. I, pp. 133-34. And, the Affidavit of Deputy Stinebaugh sets forth 
uncontested evidence that, on January 2,2012, Jeffrey Reid consented to a search of the 
defendant FJ Cruiser, that marijuana fell from the vehicle as Jeffrey Reid opened the rear door, 
that Deputy Stinebaugh smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, and that 
Deputy Stinebaugh saw cardboard boxes with marijuana plant material in them in the rear of the 
vehicle. R. Vol. I, p. 113. Claimant Jeffrey Reid has pled to delivering marijuana to another by 
means other than administering or dispensing. Nothing to dispute the uncontested facts before 
the district court was presented by Claimants and, because no genuine issue of material fact 
existed with regard to forfeiture of the defendant vehicle, the district court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of McHugh. 
Claimants cite at length to Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary 
Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 298 P .3d 245 (2013), in which this Court agreed with the district 
court that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a motorcycle was used to 
transport "for the purposes of distribution or receipt" where methamphetamine was found inside 
the driver's jacket. Claimants argue that McHugh cannot demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Claimant Jeffrey Reid's transportation of marijuana was "for the purpose of 
distribution or receipt" of marijuana. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 21. However, 
McHugh has done so via the evidence of Claimant Jeffrey Reid's plea, ajudicial admission that 
he knowingly and unlawfully transferred a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana to another 
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person. R. Vol. I., pp. 123-127. Having pled to "delivery," Claimant Jeffrey Reid "distributed" 
marijuana within the meaning of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act because he "delivered 
[the marijuana] other than by administering or dispensing" it. I.C. § 37-2701(k). 
Further, the facts of 2007 Legendary Motorcycle are readily distinguishable from the 
instant matter. Importantly, the claimant Christopher Rubey pled to simple possession in the 
criminal matter underlying the civil asset forfeiture in 2007 Legendary Motorcycle. 154 Idaho at 
298 P.3d 245,246. And, the methamphetamine at issue in the case was found on 
Christopher Rubey's person. Id Here, Claimant Jeffrey Reid pled to delivery of marijuana and 
marijuana was found in the vehicle, not on his person. Incredibly, Claimants readily admit that 
Claimant Jeffrey Reid delivered marijuana to his wife. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief, 
pp. 17 and 22. The district court properly found no questions of material fact exist with regard 
to whether the defendant vehicle was used to transport, deliver, receive, possess and/or conceal 
marijuana for the purposes of distribution or receipt. 
D. RESPONDENT BARRY MCHUGH IS ENTITLED TO HIS 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER IDAHO 
CODE § 12-117 BECAUSE CLAIMANTS ACTED WITHOUT A 
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 was amended, effective March 27,2012, to clarify that an award of 
fees is not limited to only administrative proceedings or civil judicial proceedings involving a 
political subdivision where a non-prevailing party acts without reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Cf Smith v. Washington, 150 Idaho 388, 391-93, 247 P.3d 615,618-20 (2010). At present 
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subsection (1) reads in its entirety: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.C. § 12-117(1).6 The instant matter involves a civil judicial proceeding commenced via filing 
ofthe Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Complaint Re: Civil Forfeiture on January 19. 
2012. 
For the reasons set forth supra, Claimants acted without any reasonable basis in fact or 
law. Claimants cannot be deemed the prevailing party on the instant appeal. As such, the Court 
"shall" award McHugh his reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable 
expenses. See I.e. § 12-117(1). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Claimants are attempting to appeal the stipulated Judgment of Forfeiture entered on 
February 21,2013. A consent judgment is generally not appealable, and Claimants have not and 
cannot demonstrate that any exception to the general rule is applicable. Appeal of the district 
court's summary judgment is limited to issues raised and evidence presented before the lower 
6 The Idaho Supreme Court has not distinguished between the agency representative! elected 
official and state agency! political subdivision for the purposes of awarding attorney fees. See 
Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 177 P.3d 949 (2007). The statute provides for an award of 
fees to the prevailing party upon a finding that the "nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-117(1). 
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court. As such, Claimants are barred from now presenting evidence of the value of the defendant 
vehicle, evidence which was never before the district court. And, having pled to delivery of 
marijuana and manufacturing of marijuana, Claimants cannot now claim that there existed 
insufficient evidence of a nexus between the defendant vehicle and distribution or receipt of a 
controlled substance. The district Court properly found an absence of material issues of fact and 
McHugh's entitlement to the defendant vehicle as a matter oflaw at summary judgment; the 
parties' stipulated judgment thereafter renders the instant appeal improper as a matter oflaw. 
Claimants acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and therefore McHugh is 
entitled to an awarded of his reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable 
expenses in accordance with I.C. § 12-117 on appeal. 
Dated this ___ day of August, 2013. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
lamila D. Holmes, Civil Deputy 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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